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Abstract
The Everett Box is a device in which an observer and a lethal quantum
apparatus are isolated from the rest of the universe. On a regular basis,
successive trials occur, in each of which an automatic measurement of a
quantum superposition inside the apparatus either causes instant death or
does nothing to the observer. From the observer’s perspective, the chances
of surviving m trials monotonically decreases with increasing m. As a re-
sult, if the observer is still alive for sufficiently large m she must reject any
interpretation of quantum mechanics which is not the many-worlds inter-
pretation (MWI), since surviving m trials becomes vanishingly unlikely in
a single world, whereas a version of the observer will necessarily survive
in the branching MWI universe. Here we ask whether this conclusion still
holds if rather than a classical understanding of limits built on classical
logic we instead require our physics to satisfy a computability requirement
by investigating the Everett Box in a model of a computational universe
running on a variety of constructive logic, Recursive Constructive Mathe-
matics. We show that although the standard Everett argument rejecting
non-MWI interpretations is no longer valid, we can show that Everett’s
conclusion still holds within a computable universe. Thus we argue that
Everett’s argument is strengthened and any counter-argument must be
strengthened, since it holds not only in classical logic (with embedded
notions of continuity and infinity) but also in a computable logic.
1 Introduction
The several interpretations of quantum mechanics can be divided into two
classes. One class contains a single interpretation, the many-worlds interpre-
tation (MWI) of Hugh Everett [Eve57b, Eve57a], so named by Bryce DeWitt
[DeW70, DeW72]. In the MWI, the wavefunction never collapses and essen-
tially the universe can be taken to be governed by a single, objectively real,
universal wave function. Although when he introduced this idea in his thesis of
1957, Everett never spoke of a branching universe in which the universe splits
into n branches (or worlds) whenever a quantum measurement has n possible
outcomes, this is nevertheless the common way in which MWI is discussed, and
we will to some extent use that language here. The other class contains all other
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interpretations of quantum mechanics. In these non-MWI interpretations, there
is only ever one world, and the wavefunction collapses whenever a measurement
is taken: if a measurement has n possible outcomes, only one is ever realised.
The famously accurate predictions obtained by calculating solutions to the
Schrödinger equation do not depend upon the interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. However it is desirable from a realist perspective to distinguish between
these interpretations. Having divided them into two classes, it is natural to start
by asking whether we can distinguish between the classes, either in real-world or
thought experiments. In particular, if we can show that the class of non-MWI
interpretations can be rejected, then we are left simply with the many-world
interpretation.
One of the better-known thought experiments which claims to distinguish
between these classes is a variant of the classic Schrödinger’s cat experiment in
which the cat, or rather a human in place of the cat, is the observer [Teg14,
Teg98, Lew00]. The life of the observer depends upon the outcome of an au-
tomatic quantum measurement called a trial. Many trials occur, one after the
other on a regular basis. As described in more detail in §2, this Everett Box is
able to distinguish between MWI and non-MWI interpretations. The argument
is a probabilistic one: though the observer might get lucky and survive a few
trials, continued survival in a non-MWI universe is extremely unlikely. On the
other hand, a version of the observer is guaranteed to survive with probability
1 in one branch of a MWI universe, guaranteeing the so-called Quantum Im-
mortality of that observer. The former non-MWI option is rejected as being too
unlikely. Thus only MWI is a valid interpretation.
We call the line of argument summarised above and presented in §2 Everett’s
argument and to its conclusion as “Everett’s conclusion”, more in homage to the
genesis of these ideas in Everett’s seminal thesis [Eve57b] than because Everett
himself clearly formulated them. Indeed, Everett never formally defined this
experiment, but variants of it have been given independently by several authors
[Squ86, Teg98]. It is not universally accepted. It has been attacked from various
directions, not least in terms of its real-world applicability, for instance around
the definition of death (or at least of a discrete binary distinction between “alive”
and “dead”) — see [Teg14, Teg98]. From the philosophical perspective we see
critiques based on the classical philosophical problem of individual identity and
its persistence, what it means to “expect” a subjective outcome like one’s own
death as opposed to predicting an objective event, the distinction between actual
and probable events, and the meaning of probabilistic thinking in the MWI
context; see [Lew00, Pap04, Ara12, Seb15], and references therein. Everett
himself anticipated some of these objections in [Eve57b].
There are two other ways in which Everett’s argument is critiqued, both
of which are much more general in their scope. They concern (1) the role of
infinity and the infinitesimal in physics, and (2) the role of the computable. A
motivation for the first of these is that if we live in a finite universe which has
existed for finite time, and if the fields, matter, time, and space of the universe
are all discrete at small enough scales discrete, then we should reject all objects
and arguments which employ the infinite and the infinitesimal. Such strictly
finitist theories include digital physics [Whe90], cellular automata [Wol02], loop
quantum gravity [RS88], and more besides — see [Sch97] and references therein.
The questionable role of infinity in Everett’s argument has been highlighted by
[Teg14] amongst others.
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The second critique, namely that our current theories of physics are non-
computable, is the focus of the present work. Requiring a computable theory of
physics is essentially the same as requiring all knowledge to be obtained through
an algorithmic process in finite time. It is not the same as requiring only finite
objects, but it does necessitate working within so-called non-classical logics,
as we outline in detail below. The desirable quality of computability in the
foundations of physics is not obtained by classical logic.
Thus while probabilities and probabilistic thinking have been highlighted
as potential concerns with Everett’s argument [Lew00, Pap04], and while the
role of the infinite and the infinitesimal in physics [Teg14] have also been called
into question in this context, to our knowledge no-one has examined the ar-
gument from a computable perspective before, and in particular from within
non-classical logic.
Here we show that Everett’s argument that we must reject all non-MWI
interpretations of quantum mechanics is based on a classical understanding of
limiting behaviours of functions which need not hold in other, non-classical log-
ics. In particular, we show that the argument fails in a constructive logic called
Recursive Constructive Mathematics, commonly referred to as RUSS, in which
all results are computable. Within RUSS, we show that the existence of so-
called pathological probability distributions mean that we must reject Everett’s
argument that all non-MWI interpretations are wrong. However, we are able to
show through a new argument that Everett’s conclusion holds even in a universe
(or universes) governed by such non-classical logics, thus strengthening the ar-
gument in favour of the MWI and requiring any counter-arguments to also be
valid in these non-classical logics.
In §2 we give a brief overview of Everett’s argument for how the Everett Box
implies a rejection of all non-MWI interpretations of quantum mechanics. Next,
in §3 we define computability and outline the arguments in favour of requiring
computability in our theories of physics, before giving a summary of the main
result from [MJW19] on which we base the principal argument in this paper.
With this background we prove in §4 the Pathological Immortality Theorem,
which shows that Everett’s argument does not work in RUSS. However, in §5 we
present a constructive, computable proof that Everett’s conclusion nevertheless
holds in a universe whose logic is that of RUSS. Finally, we summarise and
discuss our results in §6.
2 Quantum Immortality
A conscious observer is placed in a box with a lethal quantum apparatus. The
contents of the box are completely isolated from the rest of the universe. Al-
though the thought experiment does not depend on the details of the lethal
apparatus, a particularly clear example is given by [Teg98] and called the “quan-
tum gun”. The quantum gun consists of a gun coupled to a quantum system of
a particle in a superposition of two states. At regular time intervals, a measure-
ment of this system is made automatically, and if it is found to be in one state
the gun fires a bullet, while if it is in the other nothing happens. After either
firing or not firing, the quantum gun resets: a new superposition is set up and
the memoryless process repeats1. Each independent occurrence of this process
1This slight variant of Tegmark’s quantum gun of [Teg98] was given in [Teg14].
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we call a trial. We take this or a similar lethal setup to be indefinitely repeatable
and to occur every second2. The apparatus and the observer are isolated from
the rest of the universe, and this setup constitutes the Everett Box.
What is the experience of the observer? It is rather starkly illustrated by
Tegmark’s gun if we contrast the Everett Box with a similar experiment in
which instead of being aimed at the observer the gun merely fires or does not
fire depending on the measurement. In this case, the observer can expect to hear
a random string of bangs and clicks: the bangs correspond to the gun firing,
the clicks to it not firing and the equipment resetting. Over time the relative
proportion of bangs and clicks will tend towards the relative likelihoods of those
two outcomes. In the standard formulation, both outcomes occur with equal
probability and thus the observer expects over time that 50% of the sounds will
be bangs, and 50% clicks. Everett’s argument is actually independent of these
likelihoods, which need not be either equal or constant [Eve57b, Eve57a, Teg14].
It is such a general case we consider in this paper.
The preceding description is not that of the Everett Box, because the life
and hence consciousness3 of the observer does not depend upon the outcome of
the measurement. In the Everett Box, the gun is aimed at the observer in such
a way that should it fire then death is certain and swift4. In this case, what
should the observer expect?
The answer depends upon which class of interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics holds in our universe. If there is only one world, then each trial involves the
collapse of the wavefunction and a single outcome occurs for the observer: ei-
ther they hear a “click” or they are instantly killed (and so hear nothing). They
might get lucky once, they might get lucky twice, but as time goes on and the
number of trials increases, the odds of them surviving decreases exponentially.
If, however, there are many worlds, the totality of which contain all possible
outcomes and histories, then by necessity there is always an observer alive after
any number of trials. For example, after one trial there are two versions of the
observer, the universe having branched into two worlds at the moment of the
quantum measurement. In one world the observer heard “click” while in the
other they died. After two seconds there are three worlds. In one of them, the
observer’s history shows that they heard “click-click”. In another world, they
heard “click” and then died on trial 2. In the third they died on trial 1. After
three trials there is an observer whose history is “click-click-click”, and after any
number, m, of trials there will always be one world in which the observer has
heard m clicks. After a large number of trials there are many worlds, in all
but one of which the observer is dead, but crucially there remains one living
observer. Thus the subjective probability of surviving m trials is 1 for any m,
because there is a world in which the observer is still alive after any number of
trials.
Thus from the observer’s perspective this experiment has the potential to dis-
tinguish between the two classes of interpretation, though the stakes are high.
The argument runs as follows. The chances of remaining alive after a large
number of trials in a non-MWI universe is monotonically and exponentially de-
creasing because each trial is independent of the preceding trials. Thus at some
2The time interval is not important to the subsequent argument, other than to allow for
many repetitions within a human lifetime.
3Consciousness surviving death is not a part of the thought experiment.
4Both conditions are necessary as outlined in [Teg98].
4
point the probability of being alive will be lower than some threshold at which
the still-alive observer can reject the non-MWI class of interpretations purely on
the grounds of the low probability of such a sequence of events occurring. This
is a standard experimental approach, and as usual the threshold ǫ ≪ 1 could
be set to the traditional 5σ-level, or indeed to a level of any stringency due to
the monotonicity of the probability of remaining alive. Furthermore, with each
subsequent survived trial the confidence in rejecting non-MWI interpretations
increases. Of course, if we do not live in an MWI universe then the experiment
simply kills the observer within a short time. They do not know that they do
not live in a MWI universe, but neither do they know anything ever again.
In more rigorous terms, in non-MWI interpretations the probability of be-
ing dead after m trials, P (m) is, in the standard presentation in which the
probability of death at each trial is 50%, simply
P (m) = 1−
(
1
2
)m
which tends to unity as m → ∞. The same conclusion holds regardless of the
probability of staying alive on trial k, which we denote pk. In this case, because
pk < 1 for all k we still have
P (m) = 1−
m∏
k=1
pk → 1 as m→∞. (1)
While (1) will remain true throughout this paper, we will see that in the com-
putable logic RUSS we can no longer use it to conclude that the observer neces-
sarily must expect to be dead after any finite number of trials. First, we must
review what it means to be computable.
3 Computability and The Infinite Monkey The-
orem
3.1 Computability and Logic
A problem is said to be computable if it can be solved in an effective man-
ner, which can be more formally defined in a number of models of computa-
tion [Coo04, CPS13, Bri94]. Loosely speaking, computable problems are those
which can be solved algorithmically in finite time. The major milestone in
computability theory is the Turing-Church thesis identifying computable func-
tions on the natural numbers with functions computable on a Turing machine
[Bri94, BP18, Dea20, CPS13].
It is not simply the rise in computer simulations, nor the “shut-up-and-
calculate” instrumentalist approach to physics [Mer04], which have led some
authors to suggest that computability should be a requirement for our theories
of physics [Zus69, RS88, Sch97, tH99, Fre03, Llo05, Wol02]. It is instead the
notion of the effective method embedded in computability that is important.
A method is called effective for a class of problems when it comprises a finite
set of instructions which can be followed by a mechanical device5, that these
5The idea here is not that they must be followed by such a device, but that even a human
following them needs no ingenuity in order to derive a correct answer.
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instructions produce a correct answer, and that they finish after a finite number
of steps [CPS13].
The desirability for computability in physics is therefore a product of a desire
to know, and a belief that the universe is ultimately comprehensible to us. The
reasoning in the syllogism goes that if we accept the two premises that (1) the
universe is entirely comprehensible to the human mind, and (2) there is nothing
extra-computational happening in the human mind, then we must accept the
conclusion that physics is necessarily computable.
However, our current theories of physics are not computable, built as they are
on classical mathematical ideas which in turn rely on classical, non-computable,
logic [BP18]. There are two issues here. The first concerns the notion of infinity
and the related notion of continuity. Infinities abound in our physical theories,
whether they are in limiting behaviours (as examined in non-classical logics
in the present paper) or in the related idea of continuous matter or continuous
fields. In the latter case, even though we know that neither matter nor fields are
continuous in our universe, we treat the “gap” between our continuous theories
and discrete nature as being essentially a rounding error: the high accuracy
of predictions made with the (presumptively Platonic) continuous theories is
because our universe is approximately continuous. It is, after all, perhaps only
discrete below the Planck length, or on time scales shorter than the Planck time.
The second issue, and the one that concerns us in this paper, is the no-
tion of the underlying logic of the universe. Classical logic is not computable,
relying as it does on non-computable notions such as the Law of Excluded Mid-
dle (LEM) and omniscience principles [BR87, BP18]. Why should we work
with a logic that does not allow for computability if we wish our physics to be
computable? One answer is similar to the response to continuity and infinity:
because this logic works, to an astonishing degree [Wil18]. A second response
is simply to reject the second premise given above. Perhaps there is something
extra-computational happening within the human mind6. This is consistent
with a robustly Platonic vision of the universe. If mathematical objects exist
in a Platonic realm of forms to which our minds (somewhat mysteriously) have
access, then the necessity of computability can be rejected. This is also consis-
tent with the view above that our physical universe is only an (albeit excellent)
approximation to a Platonic form.
If however we insist with the authors above that our logic must be com-
putable, then we necessarily have to work with non-classical logics which are
computable. In particular, we should work within so-called constructive inter-
pretations of logic [BP18], in which the classical interpretations of disjunction
and existence are rejected in favour of constructive ones. For example, the quan-
tifier “there exists” becomes “we can construct (that is, give an effective method
for defining) an object for which the given statement is true”. There are several
varieties of constructive mathematics [BR87]. It should be noted that not all
varieties reject notions of infinity. Bishop’s Constructive Mathematics (referred
to as BISH) [BB85], for example, admits many classical mathematical objects
which rely on infinities and continuity, but insists that proofs using these objects
must proceed constructively (and are therefore computable). This illustrates the
important distinction between the epistemological constructivism of BISH which
remains agnostic on the ontology of mathematical objects, and the ontological
6This perspective overlaps somewhat with the notion of hypercomputation [Cop02, Cop04].
6
constructivism of other varieties of constructive mathematics which insist that
both objects and proofs (procedures) must be computable [BP18, BR87]. It
has been said that computable mathematics is simply mathematics done with
intuitionistic logic [BP18].
In order to subject Everett’s argument to a strong scrutiny in a non-classical
logic, we here choose an ontologically constructive variety of constructive logic,
Recursive Constructive Mathematics, RUSS [BP18]. RUSS is a constructive
version of recursive function theory, in which functions on the natural numbers
are defined recursively. Essentially, RUSS takes the classical recursive analysis
in the tradition of Turing and Church but uses only intuitionistic logic. In
the following subsection, we briefly outline the theorems of a recent work in
computable probability based on RUSS which will be central to the argument
of this paper.
3.2 The Infinite Monkey Theorem
Working in RUSS, [MJW19] proved a seemingly counter-intuitive theorem, which
we call here the Infinite Monkey Theorem (IMT). To state the IMT we first need
some notation. The IMT was written in the playful language of the famous apho-
rism that a large enough group of monkeys with typewriters will reproduce the
complete works of Shakespeare, but as is made clear in [MJW19], the IMT is
really about computable probability distributions, as indeed is our focus in the
present paper.
Retaining the metaphor of [MJW19], we work in an alphabet A (of size |A|,
including punctuation) and call a w-string any string of characters of length
w ∈ N . For example, “banana” is a 6-string over the alphabet {a, b, n}. Each
monkey works on a computer keyboard with |A| unique keys and each monkey
types a w-string in finite time. We define M to be an infinite, enumerable set
of monkeys (the monkeyverse), and for any m ∈ N the m-troop of monkeys to
be the first m monkeys in M . We then have
Theorem 1 (Infinite Monkey Theorem). Given a finite target w-string Tw and
a positive real number ǫ, there exists a computable probability distribution on M
of producing w-strings such that:
(i) the classical probability that no monkey in M produces Tw is 0; and
(ii) the probability of a monkey in any m-troop producing Tw is less than ǫ.
[MJW19] established an even stronger, target-free version of this theorem,
which requires only a knowledge of w, not of Tw.
The theorem and its proof are computable. That is, while it is classically true
that it is impossible that no monkey reproduces the works of Shakespeare (part
(i)), it is possible to construct a so-called pathological probability distribution
on the monkeyverse such that the chances of actually finding the monkey that
does so can be made arbitrarily small (part (ii)). The key point in part (ii) is
that this is true for any finite m-troop of monkeys; the pathological distribution
does not require knowledge of the size of the m-troop, it is simply pathological
for all finite sets.
The monkeys correspond to any finite back-box process occurring in finite
time. The general conclusion drawn in [MJW19] is that in a computable universe
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the space of all possible probability distributions on enumerable sets contains
a non-empty set of pathological distributions for which the IMT holds. This is
in contradistinction to a universe governed by classical logic in which the IMT
does not hold. It is this distinction that we exploit in the remainder of the
paper, by examining the impact of the existence of pathological distributions
on the enumerable set of trials in the Everett Box.
4 Pathological Distributions Imply the Rejection
of Everett’s Conclusion
With the notation from §2 we can state that the probability P (m) of dying
within m trials is given by
P (m) = 1−
m∏
k=1
pk (2)
for anym ∈ N, where pk is the probability of not dying on trial k. The key thing
here, in contrast to the manner in which the Everett Box is normally described,
but in keeping with the more general case which Everett himself allowed for in
[Eve57b], we consider a quantum apparatus which gives varying probabilities at
each trial. We note that it is not that the probability of death at each trial, pk,
cannot be known in advance; after all, in the standard formulation, pk = 0.5 for
all k. The restriction is that the observer cannot predict in advance whether she
lives or dies on trial k, and that her fate is determined purely by the unknowable
quantum state of the apparatus. We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Pathological Immortality Theorem). While classically it is im-
possible that an observer in an Everett box remains alive as the number of trials
tends to infinity, there is a computable probability distribution on the trials such
that the probability that the observer is alive after any finite number of trials is
arbitrarily close to 1.
Proof. The result follows directly from the proof of the IMT in [MJW19]. In
particular, we place the objects of the IMT and the objects of the Pathological
Immortality Theorem (PIT) in one-to-one correspondence as outlined in the
following table.
IMT PIT
pk probability that k
th monkey fails
to reproduce Shakespeare
probability of not dying on kth
trial
P (m) probability thatm-troop does re-
produce Shakespeare
probability of dying withinm tri-
als
The PIT therefore gives us the apparently counterintuitive result that while
classically it remains true that the observer’s probability of being alive after
m trials tends to 0 as m tends to infinity, the classical interpretation of that
result as being that after a certain finite number of trials the probability of
the observer being alive should be so small that she should be surprised at
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remaining alive is not true in a computational sense, in which that probability
can remain arbitrarily close to 1 for any finite number of trials. As outlined
in [MJW19], it is important to note that the apparent contradiction here is
only between the classical notion of the limit and the existence of computable
pathological distributions within RUSS; we are deliberately comparing results
from non-commensurate logical systems in order to show that classical logic may
lead us astray in a computable universe.
At first blush the PIT would seem to suggest that in a universe run on com-
putable logic7 Everett’s conclusion is no longer valid. If the quantum apparatus
happens to produce a pathological distribution then it is no longer unlikely that
the observer remains alive after any finite number of trials, since that likelihood
can remain arbitrarily close to 1. As a result, since the observer can never know
for sure that she is not in a pathological distribution, she cannot surely state
that remaining alive after any finite number of trials is unlikely and so she can
never reject non-MWI interpretations of quantum mechanics. However, in the
next section we argue that Everett’s conclusion should still be taken to hold
even in a computable universe and even with the existence of the PIT.
5 Everett’s Conclusion Restored
We state our main result as a theorem.
Theorem 3 (Computable Everett Box). The Everett Box implies the rejec-
tion of non-MWI interpretations of quantum mechanics even in a computable
universe modelled by RUSS.
Proof. Suppose an observer in an Everett Box in a RUSS-universe has survived
many trials. There are two situations to must consider depending on whether
the probability distribution on the trials is pathological or not. To reiterate, the
observer does not know and has no way of knowing which situation holds.
First, if the probability distribution is not pathological then the standard,
classical-logic Everett argument holds, and the observer concludes that she must
reject all non-MWI interpretations of quantum mechanics.
On the other hand, suppose that the distribution is pathological. Since
Theorem 5 of [MJW19] showed that such distributions are vanishingly rare then
the observer must reject all non-MWI interpretations since in a single world the
odds of being in such a distribution are vanishingly small. However, in the
MWI there will always be an alive variation of the observer in a pathological
distribution and hence being one such consciousness is not surprising.
To state the proof in other terms, we note that in a classical universe, so
Everett’s original argument goes, the observer rejects non-MWI interpretations
because the odds of surviving repeated trials are so low, whereas in a RUSS
computable universe she reject non-MWI interpretations for the same reason
if she happens to be in a non-pathological distribution, or because the odds
of being in a pathological situation where the PIT holds in a single world are
also vanishingly low. The observer does not need, therefore, any knowledge of
whether she is in such a pathological experiment since either way she must reject
7We take this to be equivalent to the requirement for computability in the logic we use in
our theories of physics.
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non-MWI interpretations on the same basis: namely, the unlikelihood of being
in that situation if there is only one world.
6 Discussion
We have argued that Everett’s thought experiment implies the rejection of all
non-MWI interpretations of quantum mechanics even when the computability
requirement is added to physics through employing RUSS, a constructive, com-
putable logic. Our main point is therefore that those whose rejection of Everett’s
conclusions depends on some future recasting of physics in a computable form
do not have that option if RUSS is the correct logic on which to base physics.
We have shown, in fact, that Everett’s argument still holds in at least one com-
putable logic. The case to be made against Everett’s conclusion therefore must
be stronger than has previously been appreciated.
This naturally raises the question as to whether Everett’s conclusion holds
in other computable logics. For example, can we reproduce the argument in
BISH, a computable logic which preserves most classical mathematical objects,
including some of those which involve either infinity or continuity? What about
in other logics which do not allow for such objects? And of course, what happens
in a completely finitist universe?
We have two final points to make. The first is to point out that although the
argument here is given in favour of Everett’s conclusion, the argument behind
the proof of PIT works in any situation, quantum or otherwise, in which the
probability of an event occurring tending to 1 in the limit of an infinite sequence
of trials is taken to mean that the probability of that event not having happened
in any finite sequence of trials necessarily tends to 0. In RUSS, this is not true.
The second point is to contrast the number of ways in which quantum im-
mortality is possible in the classical world and in RUSS. In the former, there
is always a single branch of the universe which contains a living consciousness
regardless of the number of trials. But in RUSS, there are many such worlds:
both the classical survivor and any observer who finds herself in a pathological
distribution. There are in fact countably infinitely many of these even though
they are vanishingly rare, since the requirement for a distribution to be patho-
logical is simply that pk > 1−ǫ for all k [MJW19]. This is similar to the natural
numbers having measure zero in the reals.
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